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Abstract
The British East India Company was originally established to trade with Asia 
exclusively, but after the late eighteenth century it gradually ceased its commercial 
function by the 1830s in the course of Britain’s adoption of free trade. This paper 
reassesses this process and reveals the significance of the creation of provincial 
lobbyists’ nationwide network to organise their effective free trade campaigns. At the 
same time, the case study of James Finlay & Co. of Glasgow emphasises that provincial 
manufacturers got in closer business relationships with a part of the London mercantile 
community and private merchants in the East Indies through their trading activities, 
which turned into the instruments of their political influence in the debates on the 
Company’s Charter renewal. Furthermore, this paper reconsiders how the statesmen 
and the Company as well as the provincial manufacturers and merchants perceived 
Asian commodities in a series of free trade campaigns. Especially, regarding provincial 
manufacturers’ perceptions of Indian piece goods, by the 1790s, they recognised not only 
the advantage of their goods against the Indian rivals, but also its limitation. This was 
reflected in their claims for the restrictions on the import of Indian piece goods in the 
free trade movement of the early 1790s. However, because their perceptions had been 
changed by the early 1810s, in the depressed economic condition, the provincial lobbyists 
did not seriously demand the state to restrict the import of these goods but rather to 
open the Indian market for their own manufactured goods.
Key words :  East India trade; East India Company; cotton; free trade; James Finlay & 
Co.
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Introduction
The British East India Company （EIC） and its trade with Asia have been regarded as 
an indispensable part of the history of the British Empire. The Company was originally 
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established to trade with the East Indies exclusively, but after the late eighteenth century 
it gradually lost its trading privileges and eventually ceased its commercial function by 
the 1830s in the course of Britain’s adoption of free trade. Until today, several works have 
tried to explain this process. The classical narratives based on the case studies of each 
provincial manufacturing city emphasised the effort of manufacturers and merchants in 
Lancashire and Midlands who increased their economic and political influence in the wake 
of the Industrial Revolution for their successful lobbying （Redford 1934; Moss 1976）. They 
demanded new markets and the stable supply of raw materials for their manufactured 
products. More recent studies that refer to the gentlemanly capitalism of Peter Cain and 
Anthony Hopkins （1986 and 1987） stress the roles of commercial and financial interests 
of the City of London and their nexus in Asia in the formation of Britain’s imperial policy 
in Asia during this period. Meanwhile, this paper will argue for the significance of the 
creation of provincial lobbyists’ nationwide network to organise their effective free trade 
campaigns. At the same time, it will also demonstrate that provincial manufacturers got 
in closer business relationships with a part of the London mercantile community and 
private merchants in the East Indies through their trading activities, which turned into the 
instruments of their political influence in the debates on the Company’s Charter renewal.
Furthermore, recent studies on the EIC and the East India trade are shifting to more 
global aspects because of the recent popularity of global history. In this trend, historians 
pay more attention to the Company’s role as an introducer of virtues of Asian products to 
the Europeans （Riello 2009）. One example of such commodities was Indian cotton piece 
goods. This reminds us that in the debates over the opening of the East India trade during 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the import of Indian cotton piece goods 
and cotton wools as well as the export of British textiles were matters of great concern 
for all interested parties. Therefore, this paper will also reassess how the statesmen and 
the Company as well as the provincial manufacturers and merchants perceived these 
commodities in a series of free trade campaigns. 
The defects of the East India Company’s trade and the renewal of its Charter of 1793
As many historians point out, Robert Clive’s victory in the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and 
the Company’s acquisition of Diwani rights in 1765 triggered the process of the Company’s 
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transformation from a monopolist trading company into an administrative institution to 
control the Indian sub-continent. Due to the initially high expectation that the Company 
would raise huge landed revenues from the conquered lands, the business of the Company 
became a national matter in Britain. This led to the struggle among different factions in 
the Courts of Directors and Proprietors of the Company for leadership for their own sakes 
at home. Meanwhile, although the Directors wished to regulate further military actions and 
territorial acquisitions in India, they failed to control men on the spot. As a consequence, 
while its military and administrative expenditures in India rocketed, the Company was 
chronically short of capital. It was crucial for the Company to transfer capital from Asia to 
Europe in the form of ‘investment’ in Asian commodities, such as Indian cotton textiles 
and Chinese tea, because it needed to meet the financial obligations at home, especially 
dividends to the proprietors and interest on debts from the administration of India. 
However, the Company failed to divert the Indian landed revenues to its investment in 
Asian goods for import cargoes to Europe. Thus, the Company needed to raise capital by 
other ways there.
One of such financial means was the sales of bills of exchange on London to those who 
wanted to make remittance from Asia to Europe. In order to maintain the solvency at 
home, it was very crucial for the Company to maintain and expand profits from its import 
trade. Nevertheless, because of its financial strain, the Company was forced to restrict the 
size of issue （Marshall 1968, 84）. Although the demand for remitting private fortunes from 
India to the UK increased, the Company could not meet it fully. This allowed ample scope 
for the growth of British private merchants as well as the merchants of other European 
countries and the US in the East India trade during that period. 
The defect of the EIC’s trade and remittance was partly offset by British private 
merchants. They originally arrived in Asia to conduct a ‘country trade’ （intra-Asian 
trade） in which the Company had less stake. In the second half of the eighteenth century, 
their trade began to flourish further under the securer and more promising trading 
environment created by the Company’s territorial acquisitions and the expansion of trade 
with China. Then, by the late eighteenth century, the business of these private merchants 
in Asia evolved into more consolidated and permanent organisations called the ‘agency 
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houses’. For the remittance of accumulated fortunes from India, Company servants 
invested in the agency houses and were paid back later by their agents in Europe. These 
agency houses used such capital for their own commercial activities. 
By the early 1790s when the expiration of the Company’s Charter was approaching, 
the Ministry largely recognised the problems of the East India trade. Therefore, they 
formulated a plan of moderate reform in the conventional trading framework based on 
the Company’s monopoly. This reform was called a ‘regulated monopoly’ （The East India 
Company 1793, No. I, Article No. IV）. The Company was still regarded as the best vehicle 
for remittance from India, in spite of its defects. Therefore, this reform intended to relax 
the Company’s monopoly for private merchants and provide them with the secure and 
sufficient means of exporting British goods to and importing raw materials from Asia. 
Although the EIC’s monopoly had always been a target of criticism in its history, the 
debates over the renewal of the Company’s Charter in the early 1790s was the first 
serious attempt to defy its exclusive trading privilege since the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. One of the groups that demanded the freer trade with the East 
Indies was provincial manufacturers and merchants. However, there existed a difference in 
degree of enthusiasm for the relaxation of the Company’s monopoly among them. Some of 
these provincial interests were closely linked with the Company’s commodity exports, such 
as woollens produced by the manufacturers of Southern England. Although they insisted 
on the opening of trade with China, their demands for free trade were relatively moderate. 
For instance, according to Bowen （2002, 406-7）, although British textile manufacturers 
always showed their hostilities to the Company’s import of Indian cotton piece goods, 
Exeter manufacturers significantly increased their export of long-ells to Asia through its 
trade at that time. However, since the woollens which they supplied to the Company were 
half-processed, these products needed to be finished by London tradesmen before being 
exported. In their memorial to Henry Dundas, the President of the Board of Control, they 
demanded an arrangement for the Company’s purchase of their finished products. The 
manufacturers of worsted goods in Norwich also insisted that the Company should repeal 
the prohibition of its servants and officers’ private trade in order to facilitate the means 
of their export to China. These manufacturers’ intention was the modifications of Britain’s 
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conventional trading system based on the Company’s monopoly. 
Compared with them, the manufacturers and merchants of northern cities, such as 
Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow, and Paisley, held more radical views. In the second half 
of the eighteenth century, Lancashire and Southwest Scotland became the leading regions 
of the cotton spinning and manufacturing industry in the UK. The manufacturers of these 
regions largely benefited from a series of technological innovations. Particularly, Samuel 
Crompton’s invention of the spinning mule and its subsequent improvements enabled 
them to produce quality articles such as muslins in the early 1780s. William Carlile （1787, 
466）, an experienced and respectable manufacturer in Paisley near Glasgow, referred to 
the advantages of the local muslin industry from the introduction of superior machinery 
as well as the weavers’ skills. However, at the same time, he recognised the limitation of 
their advantages against Indian cotton piece goods. Therefore, for the protection of British 
cotton manufacturers, he suggested the restrictions should be imposed on the import of 
coarser muslins. In this range of products, the local cotton manufacturers mainly competed 
with the Indian rivals. 
Soon, the serious lobbying was organised by the British cotton manufacturers to exclude 
their Indian rivals from the domestic markets. For instance, Marshall （1968, 85-6, 207-9） 
explains that during the second half of the 1780s when the British cotton manufacturers 
suffered from the trade depression, they argued that the Company’s unusually large 
import of Indian cotton piece goods deteriorated the situation further. As its remedy, they 
demanded the total restriction of home consumption of calicoes and muslins imported from 
Asia. In this event, the manufacturing interests of Glasgow and Manchester sent their joint 
deputation led by Patrick Colquhoun to London （Yeats 1818, 12-3）. The Company made 
a counter-argument that their imported calicoes and muslins did not compete with the 
British counterpart in the home market since the majority of these goods were re-exported 
（Smelser 2013, 112-3）.
After this event, these provincial interests of the North expanded their agitations further. 
In the debates on the Charter renewal, the import of Indian cotton goods to Britain 
became one of the main topics again. In December 1792, the Chamber of Commerce and 
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Manufacturers in Glasgow submitted its memorial to Henry Dundas. One of their claims 
was the export of manufactured goods to and import of raw materials from the East Indies 
by their own ships （Bruce 1811, viii-xiii）. They insisted that whatever good reasons might 
previously have existed to justify the EIC’s monopoly, no such reason existed any longer as 
the enterprise and capital of individuals and private companies were sufficient for carrying 
on the distant trade. However, their distinctive claim was perhaps the prohibition of the 
Company’s import of any piece goods in lower qualities for securing the home market. 
Like William Carlile of Paisley, the Glasgow interests also insisted that under the new 
Charter, the Company should not import any piece goods for home consumption, excepting 
plain muslins exceeding ten shillings per square yard and dyed or stitched ones exceeding 
twenty shillings per square yard. Moreover, as they recognised their advantage over the 
Indian manufacturers derived from the technological innovations, they also insisted that 
the Company’s export and use of cotton machinery in India should be banned. In the case 
of Manchester, in January 1791, its ‘Muslin and Cotton manufacturers and Cotton Spinners’ 
held a meeting, and insisted that the import of cotton piece goods from India by the 
Company ruined the British manufacturers （Redford 1934, 108-9）. Then, in March 1793, 
its merchants and manufacturers set up the committee in a public meeting, and on the 16th 
of the same month, its delegation held an interview with William Pitt and Henry Dundas 
（Bruce, 1811, xx-xxvii）. Moreover, four days later, the delegates of the calico and muslin 
manufacturers of Manchester and its neighbouring towns separately held an interview 
with them. In this interview, they insisted that the Company should limit the import of 
Indian cotton piece goods and that its import of any cotton goods should be prohibited 
except for re-export in future. At the same time, they also demanded the promotion of the 
Company’s import of fine cotton wools and other raw materials （The East India Company 
1793, No. II, Article No. XIV）. 
However, in spite of their active lobbying during this period, these provincial 
manufacturers and merchants did not have much influence on the Charter debates. In 
fact, many of their claims, especially those related to the Indian cotton piece goods, were 
rejected by both the Ministry and the Company. One major reason for the failure of 
their lobbying during this period was a lack of their coordinated views and strategies 
for lobbying nationwide. For example, in the case of Exeter, its manufacturers set up the 
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committee to seek cooperation with other trading towns, but they failed to do so. In fact, 
many woollen manufacturers of the city and its neighbouring towns of Devonshire showed 
their satisfaction with the status quo and denied Exeter’s claims in their memorials 
to Dundas （Bruce 1811, xxxv-xxxvi）. As can be seen, the provincial merchants and 
manufacturers of this period made too varied demands for their own interests and failed 
to form a common front against the Company’s monopoly to convince the State and the 
Company in the debates. 
In contrast to them, the private traders in Asia and London succeeded in organising more 
effective lobbying. As they played crucial roles in the East India trade by that time, they 
formed a powerful interest group led by David Scott in the Company’s internal politics. 
At that time, Scott was one of the Company’s directors. In the debates over the Charter 
renewal, they aimed to relax the Company’s monopoly to provide private merchants with 
its facilities in the conventional trading framework. For this purpose, Scott and his allies 
exploited the question on the clandestine trade from India to Europe. Although Henry 
Dundas had already recognised this problem before the start of the debates, he was not 
very concerned about its extent initially. However, these private trade interests sent 
their memorials to the Ministry, and their claims received additional support from the 
‘New Shipping interests’, one of the factions within the Company who wanted to break 
through the long-term privilege of the ‘Old Shipping interests’, another faction （The East 
India Company 1793, No. III, Article No. XXI; Tripathi, 1956, 28）. After considering the 
memorials, Dundas re-affirmed the significance of the clandestine trade on national grounds 
and the necessity of its diversion into the legitimate trade （The East India Company 
1793, No. VII）. Later, Dundas told the Company that he would include the private traders’ 
demand for legalising all persons residing in India to act as commercial agents in the new 
Charter （The East India Company, 1793, No. IV, Article No. II）.
The Ministry’s serious consideration of the clandestine trade also affected its decision on 
the EIC’s import of Indian cotton piece goods. After said interview with the delegates 
of the calico and muslin manufacturers of Manchester and its neighbouring towns on 20 
March 1793, Dundas informed the Company about resolutions concerning the substance 
of what he would bring forward in the Parliament for the debates of its new Charter 
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（The East India Company 1793, No. IV, Article No. I）. In his original resolutions, Dundas 
included the total prohibition of the use of muslin in the UK, although he admitted at the 
same time that the further consideration of this subject was necessary. However, the 
proprietors of the Company claimed that this would be ruinous to them and the dealers 
in Indian piece goods in their sale, as the trade would be thrown to the hands of foreign 
merchants （The East India Company 1793, No. IV, Article No. III）. By the middle of April, 
Dundas became convinced that this prohibition would increase the clandestine trade and 
damage the British cotton manufacturers and the public in revenue terms （The East 
India Company 1793, No. VII）. Then, against the wishes of domestic calico and muslin 
manufacturers, he eventually deleted from his proposition to the House of Commons the 
provision on the prohibition of the use of muslin in the country （The East India Company 
1793, No. IX）.
The creation of the national campaign in the debates on the Charter renewal, 1812-13
The Charter Act of 1793 obliged the Company to supply private traders with up to 3,000 
tons of cargo space every year, but it was soon revealed that this modification of the 
Company’s monopoly could not satisfy the demand of private traders, nor could it stop the 
clandestine trade and foreign merchants’ encroachment on the East India trade, especially 
the Americans. Therefore, by the time the Charter Act needed to be renewed again in the 
early 1810s, the demand for free trade increased further. In early 1812, while the Company 
and the Ministry were holding negotiations for the terms of the new Charter, the lobbying 
activities of provincial manufacturers and merchants for the opening of the East India 
trade began throughout the country. They organised pressure groups for their effective 
lobbying. 
However, before the beginning of the provincial lobbyists’ national campaign, Robert 
Dundas, the son of Henry Dundas and the President of the Board of Control, had already 
proposed admitting private traders into the India trade under necessary regulations （The 
East India Company 1812, 6-11）. Thus, the Ministry and the Company had agreed that 
its monopoly in the China trade would be preserved, whilst regarding the India trade, 
the export trade from outports would be opened, but the import trade would be confined 
to the port of London （The East India Company 1812, 51-8）. C. H. Philips （1968, 181） 
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explains that the pressure from the agency houses and the London merchants had led 
to the Company’s concession for the relaxation of the India trade. Nevertheless, because 
the London interests did not want the further relaxation of the trade, they changed their 
attitude and supported the Company to defend London’s premier position in the trade 
when the provincial lobbyists started their campaign for entire free trade to the East 
Indies. 
Although the economic interests of provincial lobbyists were very varied, the Atlantic 
traders and cotton spinners and manufacturers played a major role among them in this 
free trade campaign. The former consisted of West Indian merchants and American 
merchants in outports. However, in cities such as Liverpool, these two groups were against 
each other over the issue of the Orders in Council of 1807 （Checkland 1958）. The Orders 
restricted the neutral US trade with the French-controlled European continent, which led 
to the rapid deterioration of the political relationship between Britain and the US and the 
war in 1812. Those who were involved in the trade with the US demanded to repeal the 
Orders to restore the normal trading environment. In contrast, the West Indian interests 
were in favour of the Orders as they directly competed with the merchants of the US in 
the traffic between Europe and the West Indies. For instance, although no precise figures 
are available, a significant amount of the Indian cotton piece goods were smuggled from 
the US to the British territories of the West Indies at that time （Fichter 2010, 95-6）. With 
his hostility towards the Americans, John Gladstone （1813, 27-8）, the prominent figure 
of Liverpool’s West India interests, strongly insisted on the prohibition of the import of 
American raw cotton. He wrongly believed that for the substitution of American crops, the 
inferior quality of Indian raw cotton could be considerably improved in a few years by ‘the 
introduction of proper seeds and common care in picking and preparing’. Nevertheless, 
these two groups shared the view that they needed to diversify their trading activities to 
spread their business risks in the depressed economic condition created by the Napoleonic 
Wars. 
Meanwhile, provincial cotton spinners and manufacturers were suffering from the 
dislocation of the overseas trade. This was caused by the intensification of Napoleon’s 
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economic blockade against the British exports to continental Europe and the hostility 
of the US towards Britain. In the middle of the difficulty, they needed to look for new 
markets for their manufactured goods. Moreover, by the 1810s, they changed their 
perception of the India trade. The further growth of the cotton textile industry and the 
rapid increase in the customs duties on Indian cotton piece goods in the 1790s and 1810s 
excluded the Indian rivals from the British domestic market （Farnie 1979, 96）. Eventually, 
they did not fear the import of Indian piece goods so much and began to regard India as 
a very promising market for their manufactures. In the early 1810s, their previous claims 
for the restrictions on the import of Indian cotton piece goods entirely disappeared from 
their new petitions, although they still accused the Company of importing and selling such 
products without considering prime costs （Manchester Mercury 7 April 1812）. As a result, 
in the new debates on the Charter renewal, although the provincial lobbyists demanded 
to put the outports in the exact same footing with the port of London, they agreed with 
the government’s intention that only the port of London would be allowed to import 
Indian piece goods for home consumption because ‘the whole amount of these goods was 
very small’. Subsequently, when the India trade was opened in 1814, the import of Asian 
manufactures made of cotton wool, silk, hair, and any mixture to outports was restricted 
to the re-export purpose only1）. At the same time, although they had already made claims 
for the Company’s increase in its import of raw materials in the previous campaign, 
facing the deterioration of Britain’s political relationship with the US during this period, 
the acquisition of stable sources of raw cotton became a very urgent issue for provincial 
cotton manufacturers.
In early 1812, Thomas Attwood of Birmingham contacted several British and 
Irish manufacturing cities and outports to urge them to organise a joint campaign. 
After communicating with each other to seek the best timing, the major provincial 
manufacturing cities and out-ports, such as Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, 
Bristol, Plymouth, and Glasgow, sent their deputies to London in April. They formed 
the General Deputation and negotiated directly with the Ministry to abolish the EIC’s 
monopoly. Although these deputies held a series of negotiations with the Ministry during 
their stay, the meeting between the Glasgow deputies and the Ministry on 10 April was 
1）53d. Geo. III, Cap. 155, Sec. 17.
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particularly significant. In this interview, the lobbyists found that if they could show 
evidence of the secure collection of customs revenues at the local port, they might be able 
to persuade the government to change its intention to confine the import trade to the port 
of London. Thus, the opening of the import trade to the outports became the centre of 
the talks among the interested parties during this period. At the same time, apart from 
such a direct lobbying in London, these provincial lobbyists used letters, circulars, and 
pamphlets not only to stir up public opinion of other provincial towns but also to persuade 
major political figures to join the campaign. They also published pamphlets and distributed 
them all over the country through the network of provincial lobbyists. Compared with 
the previous movement, the collaboration of lobbying groups of several provincial 
manufacturing cities and outports and the co-ordination of their lobbying strategies was 
one of the distinguished features of the new free trade movement. 
In the debates, along with the Company, London merchants, traders, and ship-owners, 
especially buyers and others with interests in the sales of East India piece goods, were 
the major opposition groups against the entire opening of the India trade. They feared 
that they would lose their privileged positions, which derived from London’s status as the 
‘grand Emporium and Depot of Indian merchandize’ （Liverpool Courier, 29 April 1812）. 
In their resolutions as well as their direct interview with the Ministry, they defended the 
long-established and experienced system of the import trade, which confined the return 
cargoes from India to the port of London. They argued that the opening of the import 
trade to the outports without proper facilities would harm not only their business but also 
provincial cotton manufacturers themselves and the customs revenues as this measure 
would increase smuggling and frauds. Immediately, the Liverpool merchants made a 
counter-argument that their demand for free access to the East Indies was grounded on 
the birthright of all British subjects, and their port could guarantee customs revenues after 
the opening of the trade because of its long experience of overseas trade and advanced 
facilities （Liverpool Courier, 29 April 1812）. 
By the middle of April, the negotiation of the import trade from India turned in favour of 
the provincial lobbyists. For instance, Kirkman Finlay, one of the deputies from Glasgow, 
showed his satisfaction for the provincial lobbyists’ strong influence on the Members of 
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both Houses of Parliament. On 27 April, in his communication, Lord Buckinghamshire, 
the new President of the Board of Control, told the Company as the sentiment of the 
government that the import trade from India would not be confined to the port of London 
for the best public interest （The East India Company 1812, 81-3）. Later, in the interview 
with the General Deputation on 9 May, Spencer Percival confirmed that the import trade 
would be opened to the major outports. 
As for the reason that the Government changed its initial intention, A. Webster （1991, 
417） argued that the Board of Trade considered that, as a part of the government’s 
war-time economic strategy, the opening of the import trade would check inflation and 
secure raw materials and cheap food to fight the war with France. However, according 
to the records of the provincial pressure groups, they strongly lobbied Henry Bathurst 
and George Rose, the President and the Vice-President of the Board of Trade by sending 
circulars and holding direct negotiations with them. As a result, although in early April 
George Rose did not have many ideas for the Charter renewal, by the time of his interview 
with the General Depuration on 13 April, he reached an answer that the India trade should 
be opened and also that the Company should not have the monopoly right in the China 
trade, although he needed further consideration on the latter topic. From these facts, it is 
reasonable to say that the information and opinion of the provincial lobbyists persuaded 
the Board of Trade to support the opening of the East India trade.
After the middle of May, the debates on the renewal of the Charter were suspended 
until January 1813. Nevertheless, during the interim period, the negotiation between the 
Ministry and the EIC continued, and this negotiation revealed that the government’s 
intention of the entire opening of the India trade had already been decisive in May. After 
early 1813, when the direct negotiation between the government and the provincial 
lobbyists resumed, the central topic in the debates shifted from the India trade to 
the China trade. In spite of the very active lobbying of the provincial interests and 
George Rose’s support, the Board of Control did not change its original intention for the 
continuance of the Company’s monopoly in the China trade in the new Charter. In this 
respect, the Board attached more weight to the opinions of Sir George Staunton, the 
former supercargoes at Canton with plenty of knowledge of the conditions of the China 
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trade, than those of the provincial lobbyists （Philips 1968, 186）.
The development of provincial manufacturers’ connection with the London 
mercantile community and the debates on the China monopoly 
Following the opening of the India trade in 1814, several provincial merchants entered the 
direct trade with India. Nevertheless, they were still excluded from the legal trade with 
China, including the very lucrative tea trade. Thus, provincial merchants, particularly those 
of Liverpool, were very keen to break its monopoly. Many provincial interests also believed 
that China would be a very promising market for British manufactured goods. However, 
the Company sold the goods in Canton at a loss until 1827. In addition to this, Britons’ 
purchase of nankeens hit the highest point in the following year, and only afterward the 
export of British cotton goods to China exceeded the imports of the Chinese counterpart 
（Farnie 1979, 120）. The British cotton industry also had a problem within the supply side. 
For instance, in 1830 Mr Winton of Manchester referred to the impact of newly introduced 
self-acting mules, invented by Richard Roberts.
As a reason for finding new sources of employment to the working class, the 
great progressive improvement of machinery; and, as an illustration, stated that 
within these few weeks a mode has been invented of superseding manual labour 
hitherto necessary for Spinning frames, and that one child would now be sufficient 
for superintending 600 spindles. 
The factory owners perceived that although technological innovation in the industry led 
to the improvement of productivity and the increase of output, they needed to seek new 
markets in order to meet their increasing output and to maintain employment. Provincial 
manufacturers were more seriously concerned than anyone else about the social unrest 
caused by the unemployment of workers as well as high food prices because they 
employed a number of workers. Moreover, to defend its monopoly, the Company always 
insisted that the local demand for British manufactured goods in Asia was fully met by 
its exports. However, the provincial interests’ belief was encouraged by the growth of 
British exports after the opening of the India trade and the American merchants’ success 
in the China trade. As a result, in 1829 when the expiration of the Company’s Charter was 
approaching, the provincial lobbyists re-organised the nationwide free trade campaign. 
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Like those in the period 1812-13, the provincial lobbyists in the new campaign consisted 
of varied economic interests. However, some differences can also be observed. Firstly, a 
number of merchants and manufacturers, such as cotton and linen manufacturers and 
calico printers who had entered the East India trade after 1814, participated in the new 
campaign. For instance, in the case of Glasgow, such local firms as James Finlay & Co., 
Ellis, Bleaymire & Co., Archibald McIndoe & Co., A. & J. Connell, and R. & T. Speirs 
exported their manufactured products to Asia （Brogan 1951, 10; Scottish Record Office 
c1987, 502-3, 561; Webster 2006, 14-5）. To protect their own interests, they subscribed 
to local East India Associations or similar pressure groups, which became the core of the 
new free trade movement. Another difference was the less significant role of the West 
India merchants in the new campaign, especially in Glasgow. This was because after the 
opening of the India trade, their interest began to deviate from the East Indian merchants’. 
Especially, they conflicted each other over the equalisation of duties imposed on West 
Indian sugar and the East Indian counterpart during the 1820s and 1830s. 
Moreover, these provincial lobbyists were supported by free trade advocates, such as John 
Crawfurd and James Silk Buckingham. Especially, the former played a very significant 
role in the campaign. Crawfurd （1830, 87） was a Scottish Orientalist. Although he was a 
former East India Company surgeon and diplomat, he was a firm free trade supporter and 
strongly criticised the Company’s monopoly in the China trade to make the price of tea 
in the British market much higher than in the US. He also pointed out that many Indian 
commercial crops could not compete with other countries’ on the international market due 
to their inferior quality. One such crop was raw cotton. He criticised the state of British 
cotton manufacturers’ total dependence upon American cotton wool at that time. Crawfurd 
（1829, 77-8） insisted that the introduction of European skills, enterprise, and capital to 
the country was essential to resolve the problem. Due to his career in the East Indies and 
extensive knowledge on this subject, he established his respectable position in the free 
trade movement and influenced the theoretical arguments of provincial lobbyists and the 
formation of their lobbying strategies throughout the campaign.   
To end its monopoly, Parliament needed to give a three-year advance notice to the 
EIC before the expiration of the Charter. Therefore, as a first step for the abolition of 
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its monopoly, it was necessary to discuss the propriety of the Company’s monopoly in 
Parliament. For this purpose, the Liverpool East India Association made an arrangement 
to hold an interview with the Ministers through William Huskisson, its local MP, and 
invited other provincial lobbyist groups. Responding to its invitation, the deputies from 
Birmingham, Manchester, Bristol, and Glasgow gathered in London and formed the 
General Deputation as they had done in the previous campaign. On 9 May 1829, they 
held an interview with the Duke of Wellington, Prime Minister, and other Ministers. In 
this meeting, the member of the General Deputation described the distressing conditions 
of each provincial manufacturing city and outport and stressed the necessity of entering 
the new markets in Asia. A few days later, the Ministry promised to appoint a Select 
Committee to consider the Charter renewal in the next Parliamentary session. The 
provincial lobbyists regarded it as their victory and claimed that their strong claims led to 
the government’s pledge. 
Then, in February 1830, the Select Committee was set up in the House of Commons to 
investigate ‘the affairs of the Company and the trade between Great Britain and China’. 
In order to make the discussions advantageous to the provincial interests in the Select 
Committee, while they sent their deputies to London to provide necessary information to 
it, they also communicated with each other to arrange proper witnesses very carefully. For 
instance, from Scotland, the Glasgow East India Association sent to the Select Committee 
John Deans and Alexander Maxwell as they had experience residing in Asia or engaging 
in the trade. However, their most significant witness was perhaps Joshua Bates of Baring 
Brothers & Co. As he was one of the leading and influential figures in the mercantile 
community of the City of London. Kirkman Finlay of Glasgow successfully persuaded him 
to give his testimony in the Select Committee to refute remarks given by James Cosmo 
Melvill, one of the Company officials. Moreover, even after this event, the provincial 
lobbyists kept communicating with Bates throughout the campaign. After the end of the 
Select Committee’s investigation into the China trade, the provincial interests continued 
their lobbying. When Wellington’s government was replaced by Earl Grey’s in November, 
they prepared new petitions to Parliament and sent their deputies to London again. By 
then, it became clear that the Company’s monopoly was to end （Philips 1968, 289）.
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The case of James Finlay & Co. of Glasgow
The collaboration between the provincial interests and a part of the London mercantile 
interests was the key for the success of the free trade campaign of 1829-33. During the 
previous campaign of 1812-13, the provincial interests barely built up a good cooperation 
with the London mercantile community. However, according to Webster （2006, 747-8; 
2009, 72-4）, after 1814 the London East India houses developed closer relationships with 
provincial manufacturers by not only consigning their goods to Asia but also providing 
them with financial advances. It is true that many provincial manufacturers needed to 
rely on the experience, knowledge, and networks of these London houses to export their 
products to Asia. However, some provincial merchants and manufacturers made attempts 
to take the initiative in the creation of trading networks between Britain and Asia during 
this period. One of such unique examples was Kirkman Finlay’s James Finlay & Co. in 
Glasgow. The firm’s trading activity in Asia was also a significant example of the turning 
of provincial merchants and manufacturers’ commercial networks into their political 
connections.
After its establishment in the second half of the eighteenth century, under Kirkman 
Finlay’s leadership, James Finlay & Co. developed into one of the leading cotton spinning 
and manufacturing firms in Scotland, possessing three mills in Ballindalloch, Catrine, 
and Deanston by the 1800s （Brogan 1951, 7）. His firm was also engaged in the export of 
cotton twist and piece goods and the import of raw cotton. By the 1810s, it created its 
own trading network covering Glasgow, London, the European continent, New Orleans in 
the US, and New Providence in the West Indies. During the Napoleonic War period, while 
James Finlay & Co. made efforts to establish a commercial network over the European 
continent and successfully broke the French Blockade, the firm also sent Christophe Aubin 
to the Ottoman Empire to seek a possible trade for the diversification of its business 
（Brogan 1951, 14-25; Cunningham 1983）. 
After the opening of the India trade, the firm sent the first direct ship from the Clyde to 
India in 1816. Then, in the following year, the firm set up Ritchie, Steuart & Co. in Bombay 
in partnership with James Ritchie, John Robert Steuart, and H. J. & R. Barton, leading 
merchants and calico printers in Manchester （Brogan 1951, 10-1）. Moreover, although the 
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EIC maintained the China monopoly after 1814, the firm exported their cotton twist and 
piece goods to Magniac & Co. in Canton, the predecessor firm of Jardine Matheson & Co., 
via Bombay before 1822 and directly after the late 1820s. However, in the 1820s and early 
1830s, the firm struggled to increase their sales and profit in this illegal trade. When their 
unsold twist was returned from Canton to India, the firm showed its frustration to Magniac 
& Co. They regarded the British twist as an article that would be used extensively in 
China for its competitive price owing to the use of machinery for production, but in fact it 
did not yet become of general use of local weavers there. Moreover, its slump in the China 
trade was contrasted with its success in exports to India, from which the firm constantly 
made profit during the same period. It seems that such contrast between the legal trade 
and the illegal trade became a part of Kirkman Finlay’s motives for his active involvement 
in the free trade campaign for the opening of the China trade. 
In spite of its unsatisfied trade with China, to obtain information on the China trade during 
the campaign of 1829-33, Kirkman Finlay exploited his connection with Magniac & Co., 
which his firm built up through their business. For instance, in a letter dated 14 April 1829, 
James Finlay & Co. asked Magniac & Co. about ‘what article the Americans and others 
who were not restricted by the East India Company usually imported to Canton’ in order 
to know what trade British merchants could carry if the trade was unrestricted. Then, 
in the following year, their reply was sent back from Canton, although its contents are 
unknown. In addition, for the same purpose, the group of merchants and manufacturers 
of Glasgow, led by James Finlay & Co., requested the Committee of Management of the 
Royal Exchange Room to subscribe to The Canton Register, one of whose co-founders was 
James Matheson of Magniac & Co., and their request was sent to Canton.
Regarding James Finlay & Co.’s trade with Asia, it is also worth referring to the significant 
role of Finlay, Hodgson & Co., James Finlay & Co.’s subsidiary in the City of London. The 
firm was established as commission merchants in partnership of James Finlay & Co. and 
John Hodgson from Newcastle in 1809. As of 1834, James Finlay & Co. still contributed 
£30,000 to the firm. James Finlay & Co. held the significant share in the firm, but John 
Hodgson and his family were active partners who actually managed the firm in London. 
Although the firm was initially set up to trade with the European continent, soon it 
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expanded its business to Asia and South America. In the growth of London as the centre 
of international commerce and finance as well as the development of the East India trade 
after the opening of the India trade in 1814, the firm achieved its great success. As a 
result, in The Bombay Gazette, a contemporary English language newspaper published in 
India, the name of Finlay, Hodgson & Co. was on the list of leading Indian firms in London 
as of 18 February 1828, along with such firms as Cockrell Trail & Co., a London sister 
company of John Palmer & Co. of Calcutta （Douglas 1900, 27）. This London subsidiary 
provided facilities for James Finlay & Co.’s overseas trade, including the arrangements of 
shipping from London and the acceptance of bills from Asia for the Glasgow firm. 
Moreover, as John Hodgson and his family established a respectable position in the City, 
they successfully penetrated into its business community as well as the political circle in 
the Metropolis2）. Thus, he possessed ‘confidential sources’ （in Kirkman Finlay’s words） 
of information and political connections, which Kirkman Finlay significantly relied on for 
his firm’s trading activities （Brogan 1951, 190-2）. In addition, their relation was very close 
not only as business partners but also personally. As has been mentioned, for the opening 
of the China trade, Kirkman Finlay exploited his connection with the London mercantile 
community. It seems that such connection developed from not only his political career 
as an MP for the Clyde burghs but also his firm’s trading activities with the mercantile 
community of the City through its London subsidiary.
Conclusion
This paper examined a course of Britain’s adoption of free trade with Asia during the 
period between the 1790s and 1830s, and a few conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, in the 
formation of Britain’s overseas policy in the East Indies during this period, the roles of 
provincial manufacturers and merchants should not be ignored. However, to exercise their 
influence, the creation of a nationwide network was crucial for them in the free trade 
campaigns of 1812-13 and 1829-33. The provincial manufacturers and merchants learned 
2 ） Regarding his family, his son, Kirkman Daniel, who succeeded his father’s business, filled the 
posts of Deputy-Governor （1861-63） and Governor （1863-65） of Bank of England, and MP for 
Bristol in his lifetime. Furthermore, in the 1860s his firm was merged with Baring Brothers & 
Co. and he became its partner.
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of international commerce and finance as well as the development of the East India trade 
after the opening of the India trade in 1814, the firm achieved its great success. As a 
result, in The Bombay Gazette, a contemporary English language newspaper published in 
India, the name of Finlay, Hodgson & Co. was on the list of leading Indian firms in London 
as of 18 February 1828, along with such firms as Cockrell Trail & Co., a London sister 
company of John Palmer & Co. of Calcutta （Douglas 1900, 27）. This London subsidiary 
provided facilities for James Finlay & Co.’s overseas trade, including the arrangements of 
shipping from London and the acceptance of bills from Asia for the Glasgow firm. 
Moreover, as John Hodgson and his family established a respectable position in the City, 
they successfully penetrated into its business community as well as the political circle in 
the Metropolis2）. Thus, he possessed ‘confidential sources’ （in Kirkman Finlay’s words） 
of information and political connections, which Kirkman Finlay significantly relied on for 
his firm’s trading activities （Brogan 1951, 190-2）. In addition, their relation was very close 
not only as business partners but also personally. As has been mentioned, for the opening 
of the China trade, Kirkman Finlay exploited his connection with the London mercantile 
community. It seems that such connection developed from not only his political career 
as an MP for the Clyde burghs but also his firm’s trading activities with the mercantile 
community of the City through its London subsidiary.
Conclusion
This paper examined a course of Britain’s adoption of free trade with Asia during the 
period between the 1790s and 1830s, and a few conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, in the 
formation of Britain’s overseas policy in the East Indies during this period, the roles of 
provincial manufacturers and merchants should not be ignored. However, to exercise their 
influence, the creation of a nationwide network was crucial for them in the free trade 
campaigns of 1812-13 and 1829-33. The provincial manufacturers and merchants learned 
2 ） Regarding his family, his son, Kirkman Daniel, who succeeded his father’s business, filled the 
posts of Deputy-Governor （1861-63） and Governor （1863-65） of Bank of England, and MP for 
Bristol in his lifetime. Furthermore, in the 1860s his firm was merged with Baring Brothers & 
Co. and he became its partner.
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a significant lesson from their unsuccessful lobbying in the East India question of 1792-
93, in which they failed without their grand lobbying strategy to coordinate their various 
interests and make convincing arguments. Secondly, after the opening of the India trade, 
the provincial manufacturers established their connections with a part of the London 
mercantile community through their business practices of consigning their goods on the 
London agency houses and receiving financial advances. At the same time, the case study 
of James Finlay & Co. has demonstrated how its trading network with Asia and London 
turned into its political connection and influence in the debates over the Charter renewal 
of 1829-33. Thirdly, regarding provincial manufacturers’ perceptions of Indian piece goods, 
by the 1790s, they recognised not only the advantage of their goods against the Indian 
rivals derived from their machinery, but also its limitation. This was reflected in the claims 
of provincial lobbyists for the restrictions on the import of the Indian calicoes and muslins 
in the free trade movement of the early 1790s. However, by the time of the next Charter 
renewal in the early 1810s, their perceptions of the import of Indian cotton pieces had been 
changed. In the depressed economic condition, the provincial lobbyists did not seriously 
demand the state to restrict the import of these goods but rather to open the Indian 
market for their own manufactured goods. 
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